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THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHILD ABDUCTION
AND UNILATERAL RELOCATIONS BY CUSTODIAL
PARENTS: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE – ABBOTT, NEULINGER,
ZARRAGA
LINDA J. SILBERMAN *
I. Introduction
The Hague Conference on Private International Law has been at the
forefront of efforts to deter child abduction across national borders. The
1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction 1 created
both a structure of cooperation among Central Authorities and a unique
remedy of return of the child to achieve that objective. The 1980
Convention has been extremely successful, and eighty-six countries are
now Parties to the Convention. The subsequent 1996 Hague Convention on
the Protection of Children 2 built on the success of the 1980 Abduction
Convention and provided for rules of jurisdiction and recognition of
judgments relating to custody and child protection issues more generally,
including specific provisions to address the problem of child abduction.3 It
also incorporated provisions that continue the emphasis on cooperation
among Contracting States. 4 Professor Robert Spector, who has contributed
so much to the development of family law and to international family law
in particular, has been an important voice on the issue of child abduction.
He has been a member of various United States Department delegations to
* Martin Lipton Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; B.A. University
of Michigan, 1965; J.D. University of Michigan, 1968. The Filomen D’Agostino and Max
E. Greenberg Research Fund has provided continuing financial support for my research and
scholarship on international child abduction.
1. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened for
signature Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501 [hereinafter Hague Abduction Convention].
2. The formal title of the Convention is the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable
Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and
Measures for the Protection of Children, opened for signature Oct. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1391
[hereinafter Hague Protection of Children Convention]. As of October 1, 2011, the
Convention has 33 Contracting Parties.
3. For a general overview of the 1996 Protection of Children Convention, see Linda
Silberman, The 1996 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children: Should the United
States Join?, 34 FAM. L. QUART. 239 (2000), and more recently, Linda J. Silberman,
Cooperative Efforts in Private International Law on Behalf of Children: The Hague
Children’s Conventions, 323 RECUEIL DES COURS 390-429 (2006) [hereinafter Silberman,
The Hague Children’s Conventions].
4. See Silberman, The Hague Children’s Conventions, supra note 3, at 425-29.
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numerous Hague Special Commissions relating to the negotiation and
operation of these Conventions. 5 As the Reporter for the very successful
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,6 he will now
take on the difficult task of revising that Act to implement of the 1996
Protection of Children Convention in the United States.
My tribute to Bob for this Symposium focuses on several recent
developments the United States and in Europe relating to the 1980
Convention. Some of those developments I applaud – the Abbott decision
in the Supreme Court of the United States and the recent Zarraga and
Other
Povse cases decided by the European Court of Justice. 7
developments I find troubling, specifically rulings by the European Court
of Human Rights 8 in the Neulinger v. Switzerland and Raban v. Romania
cases. 9 I am hoping (and guessing) that Bob Spector will share my views.
II. The Supreme Court Decision in Abbott
A. Background
The important 2010 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Abbott v. Abbott10 brought the United States into line with the majority of
countries interpreting the meaning of “custody rights” under the Abduction
Convention. The concept of “custody rights” is central to the operation of
5. Professor Spector and I were both members of the U.S. delegation to Hague
Conference Special Commission that negotiated the 1996 Convention and both of us have
been members of various U.S. delegations to other Special Commissions on the operation
and oversight of both the Abduction and Protection of Children Conventions.
6. Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 9 (Part IA) (1999) and pocket part (2010-11).
7. The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg is empowered to decide issues of
European Community Law and its interpretation of the Brussels IIbis Regulation that
provides for rules on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in family law matters is
binding and must be applied by all domestic courts in all Member States.
8. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg interprets the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Those
decisions are binding on the Member States, but the rulings are not directly effective within
Member States in the way that decisions of the European Court of Justice are. Also, the
European Court of Human Rights may order compensation from a Member State to those
whose rights may have been violated.
9. These recent cases in the European Court of Human Rights are contrasted with the
recent decisions in the European Court of Justice in Lara Walker & Paul Beaumont, Shifting
the Balance Achieved by the Abduction Convention: The Contrasting Approaches of the
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, 7 J. PRIVATE INT’L L.
231 (2011).
10. 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
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the Convention, and the Court’s recognition of the need for an autonomous
definition is significant.11
The basic feature of the Abduction Convention is the obligation by
Contracting States to “return” a child who has been wrongfully removed
from or retained in another Contracting State.12 A removal is wrongful
under the Convention if it is “in breach of rights of custody attributed to a
person . . . under the law of the State in which the child was habitually
resident.”13 The Convention defines “rights of custody” as including (1)
rights relating to the care of the person of the child and (2) in particular the
right to determine the child’s place of residence.14 Thus the Convention
offers a definition of “custody rights,” but the nature of the rights each party
has is a function of the law of the habitual residence of the child.15
It is clear from the negotiating history and the Convention itself that a
party who has only access or visitation rights does not have “custody
rights” under the Convention. Thus violation of a party’s visitation or
access rights alone does not give rise to a return remedy under the
Convention. However, the question that had divided the lower courts in the
United States (as well as courts in other countries) was whether a parent
could be said to have a “right of custody” if , in addition to having a right of
access, he or she was able (under the applicable law) to restrict the other
parent from moving a child across an international border without
permission of the other parent. This issue of whether a ne exeat right was a
“right of custody” within the meaning of the Convention16 had become
particularly controversial for several reasons.

11. The need for autonomous concepts in the Abduction Convention, including that of
“custody rights” is discussed in Linda J. Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction
Convention: In Search of a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U.C. DAV. L. REV. 1049, 1857-72
(2005).
12. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, at art. 12.
13. Id., art. 3.
14. Id., art. 5 (a).
15. The reference in Article 3 to the “rights of custody” under the “law” of the State in
which the child was habitually resident includes a reference to the rules of private internal
law, i.e. the conflict of laws rules, of the State of habitual residence. See Elisa Perez-Vera,
Explanatory Report, in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, ACTES AND
DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIEME SESSION, TOME III (1982).
16. See, e.g., Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1068 (2003); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 949 (2001).
The Eleventh Circuit had taken the opposite view. See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (11th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978 (2004).
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When the Convention was finalized in 1980, and indeed when the United
States completed ratification in 1988, the perception was that most of the
abductors were non-custodial fathers who felt marginalized from their
children, either because they had limited access rights and/or as a practical
matter were being denied the opportunity to develop a real relationship with
their children.17 More recently, however, the large majority of abductors
have been custodial parents, primarily mothers.18 The reasons for these
abductions are varied, ranging from situations where the woman is trying to
escape from domestic violence to situations where the woman, often living
abroad, desires to return to her home country where she will have family
and a greater support network.19 Often, the mother will have been given
custody of the child, but in many jurisdictions, the right of custody does not
include the right to relocate with the child. Thus, although she may be the
custodial parent, the mother is not necessarily free to move to another
jurisdiction with the child. Because courts and legislators in numerous
countries have taken seriously the psychological studies that emphasize the
need for a child to have a continuing relationship with both parents, legal
regimes have often made a custodial parent’s ability to relocate contingent
upon the consent of the non-custodial parent, with a possible judicial
override in special circumstances, in order to preserve the non-custodial
parent’s right of access.20 Thus, many custody agreements or awards of
custody will contain a restriction on the custodial parent’s right to move
with the child, and even in the absence of an express restriction, the laws of
many countries may include a requirement that both parents consent in
order for a child to be removed from a country. Moreover, upon an
application to relocate by the custodial parent, courts have been quite
restrictive in permitting relocations when they find it would significantly
interfere with the relationship of the child and the non-custodial parent.21
17. See Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Abduction Convention Turns Twenty: Gender
Politics and Other Issues, 33 N.Y.U. J. LAW & POL. 221, 223-24 (2000).
18. For data and several statistical studies showing the profile of an abducting parent, see
Peter Ripley, A Defence of the Established Approach to the Grave Risk Exception in the
Hague Child Abduction Convention, 4 JOUR. PRIV. INT. LAW 443, 454-55 (2008).
19. See Nicola Taylor & Marilyn Freeman, International Research Evidence on
Relocation: Past, Present and Future, 44 FAM L. QUART. 317, 330 (2010).
20. See generally Linda D. Elrod, National and International Momentum Builds for
More Child Focus in Relocation Disputes, 44 FAM. L. QUART. 341, 351-64 (2010); Tim
Carmody, International Judicial Perspectives on Relocation: Child Relocation: An
Intractable International Family Law Problem, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 214, 215-30 (2007).
21. For an overview of the law on relocation in the international context, see Jeremy D.
Morely & James H. Maguire, International Relocation of Children: American and English
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Thus, more and more custodial parents are unilaterally relocating – thereby
wrongfully removing the child from the habitual residence. In these
situations, it is the non-custodial parent who seeks return of the child under
the Abduction Convention.
The Abbott case presented the precise issue of whether a non-custodial
parent who holds a ne exeat right preventing the child from leaving the
country has a “right of custody” under the Convention that would entitle the
non-custodial parent to return of a child when the custodial parent
unilaterally removes that child from the habitual residence without the
consent of the non-custodial parent (and without such consent being
dispensed by a court). The Supreme Court of the United States answered
the question in the affirmative in a 6-3 decision, holding that a ne exeat
right is a “custody right” and endorsing the proposition that the concept of
“custody rights” in the Convention calls for an autonomous definition
within the context of the Convention.22
In Abbott, the British father and the American mother were living in
Chile when the marriage broke down. The Chilean courts granted the
mother “daily care and control of the child” and the father was awarded
“direct and regular” visitation rights, including every other weekend and the
entire month of February. Under Chilean law per statute, Mr. Abbott also
had a ne exeat right: a right to consent before Ms. Abbott could take her son
out of Chile, unless the court found that consent was being unreasonably
withheld. Interestingly, Ms. Abbott also obtained her own ne exeat order
preventing the child’s removal from Chile. In August 2005, while
proceedings before the Chilean court were still pending, Ms. Abbott took
her son to Texas, without permission from either Mr. Abbott or the court.
In February 2006, the mother brought a divorce action in Texas state court
and requested a modification of Mr. Abbott’s rights, including her complete
right to determine the child’s place of residence. When Mr. Abbott’s
request for visitation rights was denied, along with his request to return to
Chile with his son, Mr. Abbott filed an action in Texas federal district court,
requesting return of his son to Chile under the Convention and ICARA,23
the federal statute implementing the Convention. The district court denied
relief on the ground that Mr. Abbott’s ne exeat right did not constitute a
Approaches, INT. FAM. LAW (June 2008), http://www.international-divorce.com/interna
tional_relocation_of_children.htm. See also Marly Sattler, Note: The Problem of Parental
Relocation: Closing the Loophole in the Law of International Child Abduction, 67 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1709 (2010).
22. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990-91 (2010).
23. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 (2006).
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right of custody under the Convention and thus no return was required. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying on several other
Court of Appeals cases in the United States to that effect.24
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve
what it characterized as a conflict among the Circuits on this point. In
addition to the conflict among courts in the United States, the highest courts
in other jurisdictions, including the House of Lords,25 had recognized ne
exeat rights as constituting “rights of custody” that would afford a noncustodial parent with such a right the ability to obtain return of the child.
Justice Kennedy, writing for a six person majority of the Supreme Court,
(which consisted of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor) held that a ne exeat right held by a non-custodial
parent constitutes a right of custody for which the remedy of return could
be sought.
B. Analysis of the Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy’s opinion addressed a number of important issues in
resolving that question. He relied not only on the actual text of the
Convention but also looked to the objectives of the Convention, citing to
both the travaux preparatoire and the Perez-Vera Explanatory Report of the
Convention. The opinion pointed to both parts of the Article 5 Convention
definition of “rights of custody,” which refers to (1) “rights relating to the
care of the person of the child” and (2) “in particular, the right to determine
the child’s place of residence.”26 The majority, in contrast to the dissent,
believed that the “place of residence,” as defined in Article 5, should be
understood to encompass the child’s country of residence in light of the
Convention’s purpose to prevent wrongful removals across international
borders.27 This was precisely the argument that Justice Sotomayor had
made in her earlier dissent in Croll v. Croll,28 where she argued that the
specific choice as to whether the child will live in England or Cuba, Hong
Kong, or the United States, was precisely the kind of choice that the
Convention was designed to protect and that to deny a return remedy for the
violation of such a right would “legitimize the very action – removal of the
24. See, e.g., Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1068 (2003); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 949 (2001).
25. In re D (A Child), [2007] 1 A.C. 619 (H.L.) 628, 633, 635, citing to an earlier Court
of Appeal decision, C v. C, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654 (C.A.), 658.
26. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990.
27. Id. at 1990-91.
28. 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
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child – that the home country sought to prevent”29 and would allow
“parents to undermine the very purpose of the Convention.”30 However,
even if “place of residence” referred to “street addresses” (as the dissent
claimed), the majority observed that the ne exeat right meant Mr. Abbott
could prevent the child from living at any street address outside of Chile.31
Thus a ne exeat right properly fit the definition of a right of custody under
Article 5. The majority also believed that Mr. Abbott’s joint right to
determine the child’s country of residence fell into the category of “rights
relating to the care of the person of the child.” Noting that the choice of
residence implicated other aspects of the child’s upbringing, such as
language, identity and culture, the majority concluded that these were all
areas that “related to the care of the child.”32
The Court acknowledged that a ne exeat right did not fit within
traditional notions of physical custody, but emphasized that in interpreting
an international convention, courts must forego reliance on local definitions
of custody in order to accommodate different legal traditions necessarily
reflected in an international convention.33 Further, it explicitly rejected the
dissent’s contention that a ne exeat right was merely a “right of access,”
characterizing that argument as “illogical and atextual.”34 As the majority
explained, the joint right to decide a child’s country of residence does not
fit the definition of “rights of access,” which is defined in the Convention as
a “right to take a child for a limited period of time.”35
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is also significant in that it focused on the
importance of ensuring international consistency in interpretation of the
Convention and emphasized that courts should forego definitions that rely
on local law usages in order to achieve an autonomous definition of
Convention concepts. To that end it gave great weight to the view of the
Executive Branch, which it noted was “well informed concerning the
diplomatic consequences of the Court’s interpretation, including the likely
reaction of other Contracting States and the impact on the State
Department’s ability to reclaim children abducted from this county.”36 In
addition the Court relied upon decisions on the interpretation of “rights of
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 133.
Id.
Abbott, 130 S.Ct. at 1991.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1992.
Id.
Id. at 1993.
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custody” by the courts of other Contracting States37 and gave significant
weight to the interpretation advocated by the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, which filed an Amicus Brief in support of the
proposition that a right of access combined with a veto on the removal of a
child from the jurisdiction constituted a “right of custody” under the
Convention.38
III. The Impact of Abbott on Relocation
The Supreme Court’s recognition of ne exeat rights as “rights of
custody” will obviously strengthen restrictions on relocation by providing
the remedy of return when there has been a breach of such a restriction as in
Abbott. But that is not to say that the Convention has taken a position on
the issue of whether or not relocation should be permitted without the
consent of the non-custodial party. States have the power to shape through
their own laws whether a “right of custody” exists. A country is free to use
its own domestic law to give complete freedom to a custodial parent to
relocate. In such circumstances, a parent with only access rights would
have no say in determining the child’s place of residence; and without a
“right to determine the child’s place of residence” there would be no “right
of custody” under the Convention definition and therefore no wrongful
removal. The Abbott decision may be a catalyst for countries to re-examine
their laws on relocation now that there is a general consensus that a
unilateral decision on relocation in the face of a ne exeat restriction is a
breach of “custody rights” that will trigger the Convention remedy of return
of the child.39
37. The Court cited decisions of the House of Lords, the Israeli Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of Austria, and the Constitutional Courts of Germany and South Africa. Id.
It also acknowledged dicta by the Canadian Supreme Court that indicated it might not treat a
permanent ne exeat order as creating a custody right and observed that the courts in France
were divided. Id.
38. The Court also cited to the Hague Conference publication TRANSFRONTIER CONTACT
CONCERNING CHILDREN: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE (2008) and to
the Conclusions of the Special Commission of Oct. 1989 on the Operation of the Hague
Convention, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 219 (1990) and the REPORT OF THE SECOND SPECIAL
COMMISSION MEETING TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION (1993), both of which indicated that ne exeat
rights were generally now understood to be “rights of custody” within the meaning of the
Convention. Id. at 1995.
39. With this emerging consensus that unilateral relocations do constitute abductions,
more and more attention has been focused on the question of when relocation by the
custodial parent should be permitted. See, e.g., CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
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States might be more open to relocation if there were greater assurance
that visitation and access arrangements put in place in connection with
permission to relocate by the state of habitual residence would be respected,
both by the relocating parent and the courts of the state to which the parent
and child are relocating. For example, several state statutes in the United
States direct a court to consider whether a foreign jurisdiction has a legal
process in place to uphold custody agreements and enforce the visitation
rights of non-custodial parents in determining whether to allow a custodial
parent to relocate to that country with the child. Whether or not the country
of relocation is party to the Hague Convention might be a factor that a court
considers when it adjudicates relocation disputes, although it is well
understood that the enforcement of access provisions under the Abduction
Convention is “weak” and that even Hague countries are not always robust
with respect to the enforcement of access rights.40 What may be more
significant in the future with respect to relocation is the impact of the 1996
Hague Protection of Children Convention, which provides for recognition
and enforcement of custody and access orders of Contracting States.
Although the State of a new habitual residence can modify a prior custody
or access order, the Hague Guide to Good Practice on Transfrontier Contact
calls for a court in the State of relocation to be “very slow to disturb
arrangements concerning contact made by the court which decided upon the
relocation.”41 Moreover, there are other provisions in the 1996 Convention
that can be used to encourage cooperation between courts in connection
FIFTH SPECIAL COMMISSION REVIEWING THE OPERATION OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION
CONVENTION 11 (Oct./Nov. 2006) (encouraging attempt to “seek to resolve differences
among legal systems so as to arrive as far as possible at a common approach and common
standards as regards relocation”). Two recent international judicial conferences addressed
the relationship between international relocation and international abduction and formulated
principles to guide States in addressing the problem. See Washington Declaration on
International Family Relocation (Mar. 23-25, 2010) and The London Conclusion and
Resolutions on Relocation (June 30-July 2, 2010), reprinted as Appendix A and Appendix B
in Elrod, supra note 19, at 369-74. A Special Edition in 2010 of The Judges’ Newsletter,
published by the Hague Conference, contains presentations given at the Washington
Conference. See THE JUDGES’ NEWSLETTER (Int’l Judicial Conference on Cross-Border
Family Relocation, Wash. D.C.) Mar. 23-25 2010, (Special Edition No. 1 2010).
40. See Linda Silberman, Patching Up the Abduction Convention: A Call for a New
International Protocol and a Suggestion for Amendments to ICARA, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 41,
48-50 (2003); Marguerite C. Walter, Toward the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions
Concerning Transnational Parent-Child Contact, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2381, 2386-88 (2004).
41. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, TRANSFRONTIER
CONTACT CONCERNING CHILDREN: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND A GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE §
8.5.3 (2008).
THE
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with relocation. The decision in Abbott, which recognizes ne exeat rights as
“rights of custody,” will likely encourage custodial parents to seek
permission from courts to relocate, thereby focusing even more attention on
that issue. In turn, mechanisms to effectuate relocation will be more
important than ever, and the provisions for cooperation and communication
as well as the enforcement of access rights in the 1996 Protection of
Children Convention may be helpful in that respect.
IV. The Neulinger and Raban Decisions in the European Court of Human
Rights
The Abbot decision in the United States and judicial decisions by
national courts in other countries, including those in Europe, have treated a
parent’s unilateral decision to relocate in the face of judicial, statutory, or
contractual restrictions on relocation as a wrongful removal. But recent
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights have undermined the
efficacy of the Convention to deal with those types of abductions and have
created a climate where unilateral relocations even in the face of express
court orders preventing a custodial parent from removing the child, are
likely to be encouraged.
Neulinger v. Switzerland42 involved a unilateral relocation by a custodial
mother in the face of a ne exeat restriction; Raban v. Romania43 concerned
a unilateral removal by a custodial mother, who then claimed that there had
been consent by the husband or alternatively that return would create a
grave risk of harm under Article 13(1)(b).
In Neulinger, the abduction occurred after the Israeli courts refused to lift
a ne exeat order to allow the Swiss mother, who had custody of her son in
Israel, to travel with her son to Switzerland, probably because they
suspected she would not return. The mother then unilaterally removed the
child to Switzerland, where she hid the whereabouts of the child for a
period of time; nonetheless, the father was able to find the child and file a
Hague petition within a year of the wrongful removal. The Swiss Federal
Court, reversing the decisions of a district and appellate cantonal court,
42. Neulinger v. Switzerland, App. No. 41615/07, (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 6, 2010). For
other critical commentary on Neulinger, see Linda J. Silberman, International Decisions,
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction — custody rights — ne
exeat rights, 105 A.J.I.L. 108-114 (2011); Lara Walker, The Impact of the Hague Abduction
Convention on the Rights of the Family in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human
Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee: The Danger of Neulinger, 6 J. PRIV. INT. L.
649 (2010).
43. Raban v. Romania, App. No. 25437/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 26, 2010).
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ordered the child returned by the end of September 2007. Proceedings for
enforcement of that order were never commenced because shortly after the
order was entered, the abductor and her child brought proceedings in the
European Court of Human Rights and challenged the return order as an
interference with family life under Article 8 (1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights.44 The President of the Chamber indicated to
the Swiss Government that the return order should not be enforced while
those proceedings were pending, and in June 2009, a Swiss district court
provisionally granted sole parental authority to the mother for purposes of
obtaining identity papers for the child. In January 2009, a seven-person
“initial” Chamber decided 4-3 that there had been no violation of Article 8;
the Grand Chamber then took up the case and in July, 2010, it determined
that Switzerland would be in violation of Article 8 if the order of return
were now enforced.
The decision of the Court of Human Rights is troubling, particularly as
regards its understanding and interpretation of the Abduction Convention.
The Swiss courts had considered the Article 13(1)(b) defense (where return
can be refused if there is a grave risk that return would expose the child to
harm or otherwise create an intolerable situation) and determined that the
mother was able to return with the child to Israel and commence
proceedings there. But the Grand Chamber ruled that the situation must be
assessed at the time of the enforcement of the return order – that is over two
years after the return order was made and more than 4 years after the initial
abduction. Then the Grand Chamber determined for itself that the
“settlement” of the child in the new country and the difficulties the mother
faced if she returned to Israel were sufficient factors to establish that
enforcement of a return order would interfere with family life. The Court
of Human Rights insisted that it had the responsibility to “ascertain whether
the domestic courts conducted an in-depth examination of the entire family
situation and of a whole series of factors” as to what would be best for an
abducted child in the context of an application for return. But that inquiry
misconceives the role of a court hearing a petition for return, which under
the Convention is to ensure the child’s safety and well-being in making an
order of return. The assessment of the “entire family situation” is for the
courts of the habitual residence to make in its merits determination of
custody. The Grand Chamber’s analysis also misconceives the role of
44. Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: “Everyone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” See
European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
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Article 12 of the Abduction Convention, which provides a defense to return
if the child is settled in its new environment, but only when the Hague
return proceedings are commenced after one-year of the wrongful removal
or retention. As noted, proceedings under the Hague Convention were
instituted in Switzerland well within a year of the abduction; nonetheless
the Grand Chamber applied the “well-settled” concept to the time the child
had been in Switzerland since the abduction. Would-be abductors may well
take heart from the message sent by Neulinger: abduct, hide, and prolong
proceedings so that the child can be considered “well-settled.”
In a subsequent decision, Raban v. Romania, the Court of Human Rights
again failed to correctly interpret the Abduction in the context of a
unilateral relocation by the mother. In Raban, the parties had “joint
custody” when the mother took the child from Israel to Romania. The two
children had been born in Israel and the parents had lived for a number of
years in Israel with their children. Upon divorce, the Israeli court ordered
that the parents have “joint custody” of the children. The mother and
children purchased a roundtrip ticket to Romania, ostensibly to visit the
wife’s mother, but once in Romania the mother announced that she and the
children would not return to Israel. The husband filed a Hague petition in
Romania and the first instance court in Romania ordered the children
returned, rejecting arguments by the mother that the husband had consented
that the children could go to Romania and that the state of insecurity in
Israel created a “grave risk of harm” to the children. In a 2-1 decision the
appellate court reversed, finding that the father had given his consent for
the children to remain in Romania until his financial situation improved and
that the possibility of terrorist attacks in Israel created a “grave risk of
exposing the children to intolerable physical harm.” The father (on both his
own behalf and that of the children) filed a petition with the European
Court of Human Rights. The European Court considered the question as
one which involved the applicants’ right to family life protected under
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court
characterized its task as one of determining whether the national court had
struck a fair balance between the competing interests of the child, the
parents and the public order – within the margin of appreciation afforded to
the States in such matters. Relying upon that “margin of appreciation,” the
Court of Human Rights found that the national court had sufficient
evidence to conclude that the father had given his consent to the relocation
and that the children were well-integrated and well taken care of by their
mother. The Court emphasized that its task was not to reassess the
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evaluation by the domestic authorities, unless there was clear evidence of
arbitrariness, which it did not find in the present case.
One might, of course, ask why the same “margin of appreciation” did not
suffice to uphold the return order by the Swiss authorities in Neulinger.
Moreover, what is troubling in both Neulinger and Rabin is the failure of
the Court of Human Rights to correctly interpret and apply the provisions of
the Abduction Convention. In relying upon the fact that the children were
integrated into their new environment and well-cared for, the Court
permitted an inquiry that the Convention authorizes only if a year has
elapsed since the alleged abduction and the commencement of proceedings.
In both Neulinger and Rabin, the Court of Human Rights effectively
expanded the “grave risk” of harm exception to include a “well-settled”
exception that the Convention itself does not condone. Moreover, the Court
of Human Rights misconceives the role of a court hearing a petition for
return by allowing a broader substantive “best interests” inquiry to be made
by the authorities in the refuge state.
These recent decisions by the European Court of Human Rights are
disappointing and are in tension with the effective operation of the Hague
Abduction Convention. This trend is directly opposite to earlier positions
taken by the Court, which had rendered interpretations of the European
Convention that reinforced the structure and mechanisms adopted in the
Hague Convention.45 Numerous rulings by the Court had rejected
complaints by abductors that orders of return by domestic courts pursuant
to the Convention interfered with family life. In particular, the Court had
previously rejected the argument that return of the child in the absence of
the custodial mother would create an intolerable situation, thereby
providing a defense to return under Article 13(1)(b).46 Although stressing
“best interests of the child,” the Court had previously emphasized that the
child should not be removed unilaterally by one parent and kept away from
the other parent,47 and appeared to accept that “best interests” are consistent
with a narrow construction of the Article 13 exceptions.48
45. For an extensive overview of the case law in the European Court of Rights on
numerous issues in respect of the Hague Abduction Convention, see the Hague lectures by
Paul R. Beaumont, The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the
European Court of Justice on the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 335
RECUEIL DES COURS 13-103 (2008).
46. See Maumousseau & Washington v. France (App No 39388/05) (Eur. Ct. H.R., Jan.
8, 2008). For a more detailed discussion of the Maumousseau case in this respect, see
Beaumont, supra note 44, at 61-64.
47. See Walker, supra note 41, at 664; see also Beaumont, supra note 44, at 37-39.
48. See Beaumont, supra note 44, at 61-63.
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V. The European Court of Justice and the Zarraga Case
Not all the developments in Europe are so discouraging. In the recent
judgment, Zarraga v. Pelz,49 the European Court of Justice held that the
order of return of a child to Spain by the Spanish court — the habitual
residence of the child — was immediately enforceable in Germany
notwithstanding a German court’s refusal to return the child on application
for return under the Hague Convention. The Brussels IIbis Regulation50
sets forth rules for jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in family law
matters. Several provisions relate specifically to child abduction issues,
including sub-paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 11 of the Regulation, which
provide that if the court of the State that was the habitual residence of the
child prior to the wrongful removal requires return of the child, that
judgment is enforceable and overrides the refusal to return by another
court.51 In Zarraga, the Spanish court, which was the habitual residence of
the child and the parents, provisionally awarded custody to the father and
access to the mother. The mother moved to Germany, and following a
period of access with the child in Germany refused to return the child to

49. Case C-491/10PPU, Zarraga v. Pelz. The decision is available on the Hague Incadat
data base at HC/E/1043.
50. See Council Regulation (EC)No.2201/2003 of Nov. 27, 2003 Concerning Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters
of Parental Responsibility [hereinafter the Brussels IIbis Regulation]. The Brussels IIbis
Regulation is directly applicable in all EU Members States, with the exception of Denmark,
and prevails over national law. For an excellent overview of the Regulation, see Peter
McEleavy, Private International Law: Brussels IIbis: Matrimonial Matters, Parental
Responsibility, Child Abduction and Mutual Recognition, 53 INT. & COMP. L. QUART. 503
(2004).
51. The Regulation imposes certain procedural steps that must be taken to activate the
override. Pursuant to Article 11(6) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, a court of a Member
State that has issued a decision of non-return based upon Article 13 of the Abduction
Convention must immediately transmit a copy of its decision together with the relevant
documents to the competent court in the Member States where the child was originally
habitually resident. Article 11(7) requires the court of original habitual residence, if it is not
already seised of the matter by one of the parties, to notify the parties and invite them to
make submissions within three months in order for the court to examine the question of
custody. If the left-behind parent succeeds in the court of the original habitual residence in
obtaining an order of custody and return of the child, Article 11(8) provides that such a
decision prevails over the earlier judgment of non-return under the Abduction Convention
and is enforceable pursuant to the enforcement procedures of the Regulation. For a more
detailed discussion of these provisions, see Peter McEleavy, The New Child Abduction
Regime in the European Union: Symbiotic Relationship or Forced Partnership?, 1 J. OF
PRIV. INT. L. 5 (2005).
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Spain. Further custody proceedings took place in Spain in which neither
the mother nor child participated because the Spanish court would not grant
a request by the mother that she and the child be allowed to leave Spain
were they to attend. During the course of the Spanish proceedings, the
father also filed an application in Germany for return of the child under the
Hague Abduction Convention. Return was ordered by the first instance
court in Germany but overturned on appeal on the basis of the child’s
objections under Article 13(b)(2). Shortly thereafter, the Spanish court
rendered a decision awarding sole custody to the father. Subsequently, the
Spanish court issued a certificate pursuant to Article 42 of the Brussels IIbis
Regulation, which entitles the Spanish judgment to immediate recognition
and enforcement in Germany.52 The first instance court in Germany
refused to enforce the judgment on the ground that the Spanish judgment
had been rendered in violation of human rights, specifically Article 24 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, because the
child had not been heard in the Spanish proceedings. On appeal by the
father, the German appellate court referred the question to the European
Court of Justice. The ECJ held the Spanish order enforceable, emphasizing
that under Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation, the court of the
original state of habitual residence has exclusive jurisdiction to decide
whether the child is to be returned. Accordingly, the Spanish return order
was immediately enforceable and any challenge should have been made in
the Spanish court. 53
52. Article 42 provides that an order for return of the child shall be recognized and
enforceable in another Member States without the need for a declaration of enforceability
and without any possibility of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been certified in
the Member State of origin. Under paragraph (2) of Article 42, the judge who delivers a
judgment ordering return of the child under Article 11(8) shall issue the certificate only if
the child and the parties were given an opportunity to be heard and the court has taken into
account the reasons that the court of another Member State had refused return of the child.
53. In a recent article in the Journal of Private International Law, Lara Walker and Paul
Beaumont criticize the issuance of the Article 42 certificate by Spain in circumstances where
the child was not heard in the Spanish proceedings pursuant to Article 42. My own view on
that issue is different. Although the objections of the nine-and-a-half year-old child were
the basis of the German appellate court’s refusal to return, the first-instance court in
Germany had found that the child was not sufficiently mature for those views to be given
decisive weight. Moreover, the mother would not make the child available in Spain because
she was not assured that she could leave Spanish territory if she appeared with the child.
The child’s views were known, and the Spanish court should be able to decide for itself how
much weight to accord those views, particularly in light of the fact that the child had been in
the de facto custody of the mother for the past two years. For a different assessment of the
issue by Walker and Beaumont, see Walker & Beaumont, supra note 9, at 239-48.
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The Zarraga case follows from an earlier decision of the European Court
of Justice, Povse v. Alpago, 54 involving a situation where the parties were
unmarried and the mother took the child from Italy where they were living
to Austria, despite an order from the Italian court preventing the mother
from removing the child from the jurisdiction. Although the Austrian court
refused return of the child, the Italian court subsequently issued an order of
return pursuant to Article 11(8) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. The
European Court of Justice held that the Italian order of return, although in
connection with a provisional custody order, came within Article 11(8) and
was properly certified. Accordingly, it was required to be enforced in
Austria. The Court noted that any argument about changed circumstances
should have been raised before the Italian court, which was the court of the
Sate of habitual residence.
It remains to be seen whether there will be any attempt to pursue the
Zarraga matter before the European Court of Human Rights in light of the
“best interests” gloss that the Human Rights Court has imposed on the
Abduction Convention. Should that occur, the European Court of Human
Rights should acknowledge the division of power between the courts of the
Member State of original habitual residence and the Member State to which
the child has been taken. This allocation along with a principle of mutual
trust and confidence has been reinforced by the European Court of Justice
in its decisions in Zarraga and Povse. Substantive judgments, including
concerns about violation of fundamental human rights or any change of
circumstances affecting the best interests of the child, are to be raised
exclusively before the competent court of the Member State of original
habitual residence. The Brussels IIbis Regulation rests on the principle that
control of the merits is given to the court which has jurisdiction, which also
has an obligation to secure and protect fundamental rights.
VI. Conclusion
The Hague Abduction Convention has been a major force in remedying
international child abductions, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Abbott
was an important step in ensuring that the Convention continue in that role.
Within the European Community, the Convention has been strengthened
through the provisions of the Brussels IIbis Regulation that give primacy to
an order of return by the habitual residence over a non-return decision by
the refuge state, and the European Court of Justice has given a strong
endorsement to that proposition in its two recent decisions in Povse and
54. Case C-211/10 PPU (Eur. Ct. of Justice, May 3, 2010).
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Zarrega. Unfortunately, the European Court of Human Rights has become
an intrusive and undermining force in the efforts to remedy international
parental child abduction. As noted earlier, in both Neulinger and Rabin, the
Court of Human Rights misconstrued the Convention in various ways and
created a substantive “best interests of the child” overlay without regard to
the important private international law principle in the Convention that the
appropriate court to make that “best interests” assessment is that of the
State of the original habitual residence. That is not to ignore the extreme
case where return should not be ordered, but the basic architecture of the
Convention is sound and should not be altered.
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